Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1965

Rulon R. West v. Terry R. West and Flora E. West :
Appellant's Reply Brief
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Bryce E. ROe; Fabian & CLendenin; Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant;
Christian Ronnow; Mabey, Ronnow & Madsen; Attorneys for Defendants and Respondents;
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, West v. West, No. 10251 (Utah Supreme Court, 1965).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/10

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
RULON R. WEST,
Plaintiff and

Appellant~

Case No.
10251

vs.

TERRY R. WEST and FLORA E.
WEST,
Defendants andRespondrs.

LED

'

MAY 7 -1965

APPELLANT'S REPLY ---BRIEf~~.:~-;;-~ c-~~~;-. -_j-i~;;------Appeal From a Jlldgment of the Third District Court
For Salt Lake County
Hono:rable Joseph G. Jeppson

Bryce E. Roe
Robert W. Edwards
FABIAN & CLENDENIN

800 Continental Bank Building

'Christian. Blmnow
Mabey, RonPow & Madsen
574 East Second South
8alt Lake City, Utah
Atto:rneys for Defendants and
Respondents
·

Salt Lc$e City 1, Utah
Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Appellant

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ......................

3

ARGUMENT
I. Finding No. 6 was not erroneous for the re,asons
asserted by the respondents .............................. ~----····- 9
II. Finding of Fact No. 3 that "gross profits"
are to be determined before deducting salaries to
partners was not erroneous. ...................................... 14

CONCLUSION ---·······--·-------·········--·····················-··· 15
AUTHORITIES CITED
CASES
Cowen v. T. J. Stewart Lumber Co., 177 Okl. 266,
58 P.2d 573 --···----------------------------·················-······· 10
First Security Bank of Utah v. Burgi, 122 Utah 445,
251 P.2d 297 -·······----------------------------------·------------- 12
McCord v. Ashbaugh, 67 N.M. 61, 352 P.2d 64I .... II
Mower v. Mower, 64 Utah 260, 228 Pac. 911 .......... 10

In re Richard's Estate,

5 Utah 2d 106, 297 P.2d

542 ····-·················-······-·,··································-···· I3

STATUTES
48-1-15 Utah Code Annotated 1953 ..................... I3, 14
TEXTS AND TREATISES
1 Corbin on Contracts, § 116. .....................................

5

Restatement of Contracts, § 75 ....................................

5

1

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
I

\

RULON R. WEST,

'

Plaintiff an.d Appellant_,

I

\Case No.
10251

vs,
TERRY R. 'VES'l~ and FLORA E.
WEST,
Defendants andRespondents.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

PRELIMIN Alt,.Y

S'J,A'fE~IEN'f

There is disagree1nen t not only as to the correctness of the findings belo\v, but also as to what those
findings are.
Respondents allege that certain of appellant's
arguments on appeal are ",vill-o' -the-wisps" and not
issues. (Respondents' brief, p. 20). Any reflection
thereby cast upon this vvriter's sense of relevancy is
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tolerable, because of the satisfaction concurrently derived from the simplifiea tion of the case which the
charge encourages.
Argument III of appellant's main brief challenged
the correctness of "the court's finding that a1nounts
awarded to defendants "\\rere 'by way of gift' ... " Respondents have replied by contending that "['f]he court
did not award by way of gift ... "; that "While the
parties clearly intended and believed that a gift had
been ·made it is completely academic . . . whether a
gift was Inade or not. . . ''; that the decision below
fallows solely from a deter1nina tion of the rights and
obligations arising from contract law, and that any
"gift talk" is relevant only to show "contract intent".
(Respondents' brief pp. 20-21.)
The only reference in the findings of facts below
to the intention and understanding of the parties in
regnrd to the eftect of the partnership and dissolution
agreements is Finding of ~_,act No. 10, which reads:
"That the parties and particularly plaintiff,
Rulon, and defendant, 'ferry, intended and un·
derstood that the effect of the agreetnents 'vhereby 'l~erry and Flora ''rould receive, upon dissolution forty ( 40Cfo) per cent and twenty {20Cfo)
per cent respectiYe ly of the amount paid into
capital by Rulon as finally adjusted and determined herein, 'Yas that snch receipt 'leas b,y way
of gift fro1n Rulon to Terry and Flora." [Em·
phasis supplied].
This finding that the parties intended and understood

4
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that the effect of the agreement was that Terry and
Flora would receive their shares by way of gift is
inconsistent ,vith the contention that their shares 'vere
awarded by 'vay of contract.
rrhe general rule is that a valid contract must be
supported by consideration. And consideration for a
promi~e tnust be something ''bargained for . . . '' Restatement of Contracts, §7·:5. Rulon, in executing these
agreements, did ,not bargain for anything Terry either
did or promised to do, and rferry was under no Inisconception that Rulon had bargained for anything
Terry either did or prornised to do, if both ·Rulon and
Terry intended and understood that the effect of the
agreements was that Terry and Flor.,~ would receive.
their shares by way of gift.
There are circumstances where informal contracts
not supported by "bargained for" consideration are
enforceable. 1 Corbin on Contracts, §116. But the exceptions are not applicable to this case.
If respondents are unwilling to meet the issue of
whether there was a gift, the result is that the dissolution agreement is not a legally operative document.
At the time this action was commenced, the partnership was being operated by Terry much as before, and
no sale of any substantial part of the partnership assets
had been made. There was no winding up of the partnership affairs. 'fhere had been no reliance by Terry on
the dissolution agreement which might conceivably
have-nlade applicable an exception to the general rule

5
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on "bargained for" consideration. Therefore, it could
not have been effective as a contract, in view of Finding
No. 10. Even apart fro1n Finding No. 10, it was not
valid as a contract for the reasons already detailed in
Argument II of the main brief.
'l,he dissolution agree1nent should be deemed relevant only as it sheds light on the intention and understanding of the parties at the time the partnership was
created and at the various subsequent ti1nes when Rulou
made additional financial contributions. As evidence
of this earlier intention, however, it would see1n to haYe
little value. As said in the main brief, the 1960 talk
between the parties about gifts, sharing capital accounts, and the desire of ltulon to make so1ne provision
for distribution of his estate, all occurred at about the
time the parties were attempting to settle their differences. Ahnost three years had passed since the articles
of partnership were entered into, and although those
negotiations might haYe a bearing upon the i11terpre~
tation and effect of the agree1nents of March and April,
1960. their bearing upon "That the parties meant in
Septen1ber and October~ 1957~ is not discernible except insofar as they seem to be negotiating about
something Rulon owned,.
Flurthermore, if the respondents are unwilling to
meet the issue of '""hether there was a giftJ the result
should be that the partnership agreement itself, insofar
as it relates to the shares ' T hich the partners are to
receive on dissolution, is also legally inoperative because

0
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of Finding No. 10. It is true that pursuant to that
agreement 'ferry began to 1nanage the business, but
there is no showing that the salary he was to receiYe
,vas not adequate compensation for the services rendered. Indeed, when he undertook management of the
business it would be difficult to believe that he was
relying heavily on future contributions to be made by
Rulon, because there "'as no assurance that such contributions would be made. In regard to Flora, there
is no evidence of any significant reliance whatever.
Consequently this is not a case for the application of
any principal of promissory estoppel on behalf of either
Terry or Flora, which might otherwise be an exception
to the rule on consideration.
Before replying to the arguments on cross appeal,
this writer would like to make brief reference to respondents' use of the record in their brief.
On page 9 of respondent's brief, the following
question and answer from Flora's deposition (R. 179)
are quoted:

"Q.: Was it your thought, then, that if you
received some share of the corporation (partnership) that it dated from that gift you are talking
about?

·. "A.: From the beyinniny ... from the begining
... from the beginnin,q of the partnership. (R.
179 (Emphasis added) ."

The court may find it helpful to read the next question
and ans,vcr in the same deposition (R. 179).

7
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"Q.: And, as I understand, you figured even
at the moment you received this so-called gift
that you already o'vned 40 per cent of the partnership?

"A.: I never give [sic] it a thought because I
didn't go into detail there. I never thought of
it being sold, to ever go into it' that far. I was
more worried about the losses in [sic] the profits
than anything, because that concerned me ·more
than anything.''
In the answer quoted by respondents, Flora adamantly
claims her· interest in the partnership dated from the
beginning of the partnership. In her very next answer,
which respondents omitted ,from their brief, Flora said
she never thought about "Then she got any interest in
the partnership capital. She was n1ore interested in
profit and loss.
Similar observations might be made about the other
quotation fro1n Flora's deposition on that same page
( p. 9) of respondents' brief.
On ·page 16 ·of respondents' brief, Flora's depo·
sition is again quoted.

"Q.: It was your understanding that you would
be the owner of 20 per cent of that (Terry's
investment)

A.: Of what he put in?
Q.: Yes.

A.: That all depended. * * * if the thing was
sold} !JO'zt .knot:c what hap pens. If it isn't sol~,
I co1ne in for profits.
added)".

(R. 182)

(Emphas~s

8
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The last answer of Flora, without omissions, reads in
its entirety (R. 182) :
"A.: 'fbat all depended. I don't know, if the
thing was sold, you know, what happens. If
it isn't sold, I co1ne -in for profit. I don't know
that 'ferry's went into profits; I think it went
into assets. I don't know; I have never asked
. ,
hun.
It is not inconceivable that Flora meant what respondents, by leaving out wo~ds and punctuation, quote her
as saying. However, in view of Flora's earlier stateInents, as noted above, to the effect that she was more
concerned about profit and loss than an interest in
capital, the court may wish to conclude that Flora meant
what she said, without leaving out any words or punctuation.
It is probably inevitable that in any case where
it must be determined whether the evidence supports
the findings below, the demands on the court's time are
unusually great because a careful review of the record
is required in order to reconstruct an accurate picture
of what happened and what was said, in its proper
context.

ARGUMENT
I
FINDING ,NO. 6 -\VAS NOT ERRONEOUS
FOR 'fHE REASONS ASSERTED BY THE
RESPONDENTS.
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Appellant urges that all sums paid into the partnership should be returned to him, subject to minor
adjustments, and not just those sums put into the
business af~er Dece:mber a; 1958~ In any event, the
sums ·paid into the partnership after that date should
he returned to appellant and Finding No. 6 was not
erroneous for the reasons asserted by respondents.
Respondents contend in Argument VII that Exhibits 9 and 10, which are letters written by Rulon to
Terry, were improperly admitted in evidence. Exhibit
9 was a letter in which Rulon as~d Terry to make
up a series of notes representing the money Rulon
had put into the business .Exhibit 10 was another letter
to Terry referring to the same matter. Respondents
argue that these letters were self-serving and the admission thereof was a violation of the hearsay rule.

If a statement is relevant without regard to the
rna tters asserted therein, there can be no valid hearsay
objection to its admission for the purpose simply of
sho_wing that the state1nent was made. Mower v. Mower,
64 Utah 260, 228 Pac. 911, 915.
In Cowen v. T. J. Stewart Lumber Co.~ 177 Okl.
266, 58 P .2d 573, an· impoi·tant ·issue was whether the
relationship between two companies was that of prin·
cipal and agent 01~ ·seller and buyer. Invoices sent by
one C0111pany to the .other 'vere offered in evidence to
show that the latter relationship existed. In upholding
the trial cou_rt's admission of the evidence, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court said:

10
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"Great emphasis is 1nade by the defendant that
such evidence was self-serving. All evidence is
self-serving at the time it is offered, else it would
not be offered. ''rhether declarations or communications are self-serving is determined as
of the time they are made. And though a declaration may be self-serving on one issue, it may
have independent releYance 011 another issue,
and for that reason be admissible. The rule of
exclusion of self -serving declarations is a branch
of the hearsay rule and its application is governed largely by the same tests. The inYoices in
the present case \vere not offered as evidence
that the material was furnished, for that fact was
admitted. They "~ere offered for the purpose of
establishing the relationship of the parties, circumstantially, and not as direct evidence of the
truth of the subject-Inatter of the invoices themselves." 58 P.2d at 576-77.
Another case in which writings were held to have
been properly admitted because not offered to prove
the truth of the matters therein asserted is McCord v.
Ashbaugh_, 67 N. 1\'I. 61, 352 P.2d 641. An important
issue in that case was whether a grantee (not a party
in the case) had received any beneficial interest in the
property. 'fhe grantor offered in evidence correspondence between his attorney and Forest Service officials
to show the motivating factor in conveying the property. The court held the evidence admissible because it
was not offered to prove the truth of anything contained in the correspondence.
Regardless of whether or not Rulon had put into
the business th(~ n1oney he refers to in the letters, and

11
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regardless of whether· or not interest was to accrue
at the rate of 57o per annun1 in accordance with their
"mutual understanding," the ]etters are relevant because the mere fact that Rulon said what he did therein
is only consistent with a finding that at least from that
time forward money advanced by him was to be returned.
Another basis for upholding the trial court's admission of Exhibits 9 and 10 is that they are relevant
to show Rulon's intent, and declarations showing intent
are exceptions to the hearsay rule. As said in First
~ecurity Bank of Utah v. Burgi~ 122 Utah, 445, 251
P.2d 297:
"Delivery is essentially a matter of intent.
Such intent is to be arrived at from all the facts
and surrounding circumstances, both before and
,_after the date of the deed, including declarations
of the alleged grantor vlhere it appears the declarations are made fairly and in the ordinary
course of life. Stanley v. Stanley, 97 Utah 520,
~4 P .2d 465; Thlower v. Mower, 64 Utah 260,
228 Pac. :911, 914." 251 P.2d at 299.
'l.,he grantor in the Burgi case was deceased, but the
court's state1ne:ht is not li1nited to declarations of a
deceased and in principle there is no- reason ,vhy it
should be.
None of the cases cited in respondents' brief iri
support of their arg'ument that Exhibits 9 and 10 were
imp1·operly admitted involved situations where the evi·
dence ,vas relevant ",.ithout regard to the truth of the

12
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1natters

therein asserted or where the evidence was of
intention ,vhere intention was a relevant issue.
Exhibits 9 and 10 were not only properly ad1nitted
in evidence, but counsel for the respondents did not
adequately point out at the trial what he claimed was
wrong ,vith the exhibits in order to preserve an objection for review on appeal. See In Re Richard~s Estate~
5 U. 2d 106, 297 P.2d 5~t2. Counsel for respondents
did not object to Exhibit 9 as being self-serving or
hearsay. (R. 156). The objection was made to Exhibit
10 that it was "completely self-se1·ving" (R. 157),
but no reference was 1nade to the hearsay rule. Appe~
lant contends that this objection was not specific enough.
There would hardly be any record in this case if everything which is self -serving were omitted. As revealed in
respondents' brief (p. 31), the real objection raised on
appeal is that the evidence was hearsay, which objection was not raised in the trial court.
Respondents contend in .L\rgument VII that Finding No. 6 is also erroneous because "it seeks to i1npose
a contract of loan which is always bilateral, upon the
parties by proof only of a unilateral intent of one
party." (p. 31) There is no elaboration of this point.
The word "loan" is used frequently by all parties in
this case and is perhaps a useful term to refer to advances by one party which are to be returned to him.
The word is not used, however, in 48-1-15 Utah Code
Annotated 1953 'vhich states the usual rights and duties
of partners, subject to ~ny agreement between them.
Subsection ( 1 ) thereof provides :

13
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Ill

· . "Each partner shaH be repaid his contribu. _t1ons, w~ether by way of capital or advances to
· the partnership property . . ."
It is clea:r; fro~ this._provision, con~rary to respondents'
assertion,. that the bilateral. intent is r_equired to h~~e
money advanced by .a partner not repaid to him. Whereas the word "loan" has been used by the parties," the
word has been used in a very special sense and the
general law on ban~ loant? or any other kind of loans
is not necessarily applicable.·

II

FINDING OF FACT NO. 3 'fHAT "GROSS
PROFITS" ARE TO -BE DETERMINED BEFORE DEDUCTING SALARIES TO PARTNERS WAS- NOT ERRONEOUS.
Respondents.· contend that salaries to partners
should be dedu~ted in calculating gross profits. Article
5 of the partnership agreement is cited to show that
Terry's s~lary was an "expense item and not a distribution ()f profit to him.": (Respondents' brief, p. 37).
Article 5 states that Terry's salary is to be deducted before "any division of net profits is made."
(Emphasis supplied.) If net profits as used in article
5 are any different frotn gross profits as used in article
4, it is reasonable that Terry's salary might be deducted
in calculating the for1ner but not the latter.
Respondents suggest that Finding No. 3 in effect

14
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1

means that Terry's salary is a "distribution of profit
to him" Respondents' brief p. 37). Whatever respondents meant by this, they surely did not mean to i1nply
that Terry's salary is part of the 40% share 'vhich the
court found him entitled to, because that would not
be true. See Finding No. 4 (R. 69).
...--:-~

CONCLUSION

The relief sought by appellant on appeal should
be granted and the relief sought by respondents on
cross appeal should be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
Bryce E. Roe
Robert W. Edwards
FABIAN & CLENDENIN
Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

800

Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Appellant
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